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Rebalancing the Unbalanced Constitution: Juridification and 
National Security in the United Kingdom 
 
Roger Masterman 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The twentieth century history of judicial review in national security cases in the 
United Kingdom (UK) provides an interesting counter-perspective to the orthodox, 
expansionary, accounts of review of administrative discretion in that jurisdiction 
during the same period.  While in Ridge v. Baldwin,
1
 Padfield v. Minister for 
Agriculture
2
 and Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission
3
 the Appellate 
Committee of the House of Lords was able to reinvigorate the prerogative orders and 
lay the foundations of modern administrative law,
4
 judicial review of decisions taken 
on national security grounds was, for much of the twentieth century, held in an uneasy 
stasis.  Simultaneously haunted by precedents such as Liversidge v. Anderson
5
 and 
hamstrung by a perceived lack of competence to challenge judgments of the elected 
branches supported by assertions of imminent threat, the courts found themselves 
powerless to effectively displace the suggestion that national security questions were 
tantamount to being non-justiciable.
6
   
 
Progress towards bringing national security decisions within the supervisory 
jurisdiction of the courts demonstrated the common law at its incremental worst, 
lagging significantly behind judicial review in other spheres of executive discretion.  
Successes were often Pyrrhic; even in the notable GCHQ case – in which executive 
orders taken pursuant to the prerogative were found to be susceptible to review on 
procedural fairness grounds – Lord Diplock was able to follow his seminal 
restatement of the grounds of judicial review with the assertion that national security 
nevertheless remained  
  
… a matter upon which those upon whom the responsibility rests, and not the 
courts of justice, must have the last word. It is par excellence a non-justiciable 
question.  The judicial process is totally inept to deal with the sort of 
problems, which it involves.
7
   
 
                                                 
1
 Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] A.C. 40.   
2
 Padfield v. Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] A.C. 997.  
3
 Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147.  
4
 For an overview see: R. Stevens, The English Judges: Their Role in the Changing Constitution (2005, 
Oxford; Hart Publishing).   
5
 Liversidge v. Anderson [1942] A.C. 206.  See also: R v. Halliday [1917] A.C. 260.   
6
 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Hosenball [1977] 1 WLR 766, p. 778: 
“There is a conflict between the interests of national security on the one hand and the freedom of the 
individual on the other.  The balance between the two is not for a court of law.  It is for the Home 
Secretary.  He is the person entrusted by Parliament with the task”.  
7
 Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] 1 A.C. 374, at [412].  See also 
The Zamora [1916] 2 A.C. 77, [107]: “Those who are responsible for the national security must be the 
sole judge of what national security requires.  It would be obviously undesirable that such matters 
should be made the subject of evidence in a court of law or otherwise discussed in public”.   
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The ‘striking consistency’8 of the courts’ position during this period leads to the 
almost irresistible conclusion that national security decisions – regardless of their 
consequences for the rights or interests of individuals – fell unquestionably within the 
four corners of discretionary jurisdiction available to the executive, and therefore 
beyond the supervisory jurisdiction of the law courts.   
 
In the light of broader developments in the law of judicial review, the ‘mystical 
significance’9 attached to the executive assertion of national security demonstrates a 
number of significant departures from the orthodox account of the development of the 
judicial function within the constitution.  First, judicial review cases in which national 
security issues were present embraced a peculiar counter-polycentricity mindset.  
While judicial avoidance of intensive review of social or economic issues frequently 
emphasised the inability of the court to second-guess complex policy choices, national 
security questions were presented differently, leaving a sense that it was the simplicity 
(the apparent self-evidence that national security decisions are for the executive 
alone), rather than the complexity of the discretionary judgements made, that 
prompted the judicial denial of competence to intervene.  Facts which melded intricate 
questions of public power, sensitive evidence and individual liberties were routinely 
distilled into a zero-sum claim.  Second, in a constitution which has enjoyed an 
ambivalent relationship with separation of powers – in which the division of 
governmental functions is as often inferred as it is made explicit
10
 – the solidity with 
which the courts insulated (apparently unfettered) executive competence over 
questions of security was remarkable.  Finally, and most pertinently, for the reason 
that national security litigation resisted (or, at the very least, did not fully embrace) 
the expansionary tendencies of mainstream judicial review during the latter part of the 
twentieth century, one of the standard threads running through the juridification 
narrative – the judicially-driven nature of constitutional development – is 
conspicuously absent from the national security arena.  The cumulative effect of these 
factors is that review of national security issues was seen to either be on the fringes of 
justiciability or on the very lowest rungs of the Wednesbury scale.  Either way, the 
twentieth century history of counter-terrorist judicial review in the UK demonstrated a 
constitution in which courts were both powerless to counter the effects of rights-
infringing decisions and unduly reliant on the fortuitous compliance of the elected 
branches to achieve any meaningful change.
11
 
 
Juridification on the Human Rights Act Model 
 
Prior to the introduction of the Human Rights Act (HRA), the inability of judicial 
review to operate as an effective tool of scrutiny in the national security arena 
amounted to a significant weakness in the ability of the courts to subject government 
                                                 
8
 A. Tomkins, “National Security and the Role of the Court: a Changed Landscape?” (2010) 126 Law 
Quarterly Review 543, p. 543.    
9
 S. Brown, “Public Interest Immunity” (1994) Public Law 579, p. 589.  
10
 M. Arden, “Judicial Independence and Parliaments” in K. Ziegler, D. Baranger and A. W. Bradley 
(eds.), Constitutionalism and the Role of Parliaments (2007, Oxford; Hart Publishing), p.192.   
11
 As both de Londras’ and Jenkins’ chapters in this collection remind us, the possibility of that both 
trends might continue has by no means been eradicated by the move toward heightened scrutiny in the 
counter-terrorism arena under the Human Rights Act 1998: F. de Londras, “Counter-Terrorist Judicial 
Review as Regulatory Constitutionalism” and D. Jenkins, “When Good Cases Go Bad: Unintended 
Consequences of Rights-Friendly Judgments”, in F. Davis & F. de Londras, Critical Debates on 
Counter-Terrorism (2014; Cambridge University Press). 
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to the rule of law.  This problem was compounded by the parallel inadequacy of the 
legislature to effectively supervise the prerogative powers – the ‘dead ground’ of the 
constitution
12
 – frequently deployed in pursuance of national security objectives.  It 
took implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998 to provide the legislative impetus 
to weaken, and finally break down, this rigid separation of functions and to expose 
national security decisions which interfered with individual rights to meaningful 
judicial scrutiny.  The extent of this change should not be understated; in the light of 
the implementation of the Human Rights Act, national security justifications could (or 
should) no longer operate as virtually unquestionable defences to executive, or 
legislative, action interfering with one or more of the Convention rights.
13
   
 
The reach of the Human Rights Act’s provisions is potentially huge; section 3(1) 
directs that all statutory provisions be interpreted – as far as is possible to do so – in 
order to achieve compatibility with the Convention rights; section 6(1) requires that 
all executive decisions (other than those compelled by primary legislation or by 
legislation which might not be interpreted in a Convention right-compatible manner
14
) 
be compliant with the Convention rights.  Operating in tandem, these two provisions 
narrowed those areas of governmental action, which could – previously in some cases 
without even meaningful argument – be found to fall outside the reach of judicial 
scrutiny.  As Baroness Hale has recognised, following the implementation of the 
Human Rights Act, ‘if a Convention right requires the court to examine and 
adjudicate upon matters which were previously regarded as non-justiciable, then 
adjudicate it must.’15  The Human Rights Act therefore required that a higher standard 
of justification be applied before either legislative or executive interference with 
fundamental rights on national security grounds would be deemed to be necessary in a 
democratic society.  National security might provide justification for interference with 
rights, but would no longer operate as an unquestionable trump.   
 
But just as national security would no longer act to render judicial supervision 
meaningless, nor would the Human Rights Act subject all decisions taken in the name 
of the maintenance of security to judicial override.  While judicial protection of 
ECHR rights is very clearly at the heart of the Human Rights Act scheme, the powers 
granted to courts do not permit the explicit invalidation of primary legislation and 
appreciate that infringements of qualified rights might be permissible – so long as 
proportionate – in pursuance of the protection of national security objectives.  In 
parallel, the elected branches were also to shoulder partial responsibility for the 
realisation of the Human Rights Act project.  Far then from simply amounting to an 
‘unprecedented transfer of political power from the executive and legislature to the 
judiciary’16 the Human Rights Act sought to realign constitutional power in a more 
                                                 
12
 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 AC 513, 
[567]. 
13
 Section 1(1) Human Rights Act 1998.  
14
 Section 6(2) Human Rights Act 1998.   
15
 R (on the application of Gentle) v. The Prime Minister [2008] UKHL 20, at [60].  See also 
International Transport Roth GmbH v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] QB 728, at 
[27] (Simon Brown LJ): “Judges nowadays have no alternative but to apply the Human Rights Act 
1998”. 
16
 K. D. Ewing, “The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary Democracy” (1999) 62 Modern Law 
Review 79, p. 79.  See also M. Pinto-Duschinsky, Bringing Human Rights Back Home: Making Human 
Rights Compatible with Parliamentary Democracy in the United Kingdom (2010, London; Policy 
Exchange), p. 9.  And for an especially indignant assessment see J. Allan, “Statutory Bills of Rights: 
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sophisticated manner.
17
  Properly construed, the juridification prompted by the 
Human Rights Act should be seen as a complement, rather than a challenge, to 
democratic government.
18
  Rather than to empower the judicial branch at the explicit 
expense of the political, the intent behind the Human Rights Act was to encourage 
protection of, and sensitivity to, rights through ‘institutional balance, joint 
responsibility and deliberative dialogue.’19  In a departure from the classic, 
constitutionalised and judicially-enforced bill of rights model, the Human Rights Act 
envisaged collaboration between the branches of government in which Parliament was 
intended to be as active a participant in protecting rights as the independent 
judiciary.
20
  The Act therefore serves dual constitutional aims: first (and classically) to 
function as a judicially-imposed stop on rights-infringing policies and to permit the 
higher courts to highlight rights-based inadequacies in primary legislation; second to 
function as a catalyst for the development of rights-conscious policy and legislation.   
 
In the national security arena, in which the effects of judicial supervision were 
historically as inconspicuous as they were ineffectual,
21
 this rebalancing of 
constitutional supervisory powers might be seen as being unobjectionable, valuable, 
perhaps even to be celebrated.  Given that national security decisions and policy were 
traditionally seen to be the sole preserve of the executive – ‘[t]he first duty of 
government is the defence of the realm’22 – the Human Rights Act made the 
realisation of effective checks and balances a more tangible possibility.  Yet the 
undoubted difficulty of the Human Rights Act was that it also brought with it the 
danger of breaking down the principled distinction between primary and secondary 
decision-maker that had traditionally supported judicial review of executive 
discretion.  As a result, critics of juridification argued that within the enforcement of 
the Human Rights Act lay the potential to illegitimately stifle democratic governance 
through challenging the legal sovereignty of Parliament,
23
 through the tendency of the 
                                                                                                                                            
You read words in, you read words out, you take Parliament’s clear intention and you shake it all about 
– doin’ the Sankey Hanky Panky” in T. Campbell, K.D. Ewing and A. Tomkins (eds.), The Legal 
Protection of Human Rights: Sceptical Essays (2011; Oxford University Press).      
17
 On which see R. Masterman, The Separation of Powers in the Contemporary Constitution: Judicial 
Competence and Independence in the United Kingdom (2011; Cambridge University Press).   
18
 A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 A.C. 68, at 
[42]: “It is of course true that the judges in this country are not elected and are not answerable to 
Parliament.  It is also of course true … that Parliament, the executive and the courts have different 
functions.  But the function of independent judges charged to interpret and apply the law is universally 
regarded as a cardinal feature of the modern democratic state, a cornerstone of the rule of law itself”.  
And see: F. Davis, “The Human Rights Act and Juridification: Saving Democracy from Law” (2010) 
30 Politics 91.   
19
 S. Gardbaum, “The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism” (2001) 49 American Journal 
of Comparative Law 707, p. 710. 
20
 Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill (1997), Cm.3782, para. 3.6 available at 
http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/hoffice/rights/contents.htm 
21
 On which see: I. Leigh and L. Lustgarten (eds.), In From the Cold: National Security and 
Parliamentary Democracy (1994, Oxford; Clarendon Press), Chapter 12.  
22
 International Transport Roth GmbH v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA 
Civ 158; [2003] QB 728, at [85].  See also: Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AF (No.3) 
[2010] 2 A.C. 269, at [75]. 
23
 M. Pinto-Duschinsky, Bringing Human Rights Back Home: Making Human Rights Compatible with 
Parliamentary Democracy in the United Kingdom (2010, London; Policy Exchange), p.57:  “[t]he post-
1998 system is unacceptable because it permits the judiciary to usurp parliamentary sovereignty in a 
manner that lacks democratic accountability”.       
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elected branches to ‘capitulate’ to the demands of adjudicative processes24 and 
through prompting the development of only policy and legislation felt to be able to 
withstand judicial scrutiny.
25
     
 
Restraint of governmental power was, of course, a partial objective of the Human 
Rights Act, but the emergence of a so-called ‘culture of compliance’ under which the 
elected branches of government (in spite of the apparent institutional balance struck 
by the Human Rights Act) found themselves subjected – explicitly and implicitly – to 
judicial determinations of rights questions was also touted as a consequence of this 
rebalancing of constitutional power.
26
  Though the likelihood of the (supposedly) 
sovereign UK Parliament suddenly reconceptualising itself as an ‘adjunct of the 
courts’27 in the aftermath of implementation of the Act seemed at best remote, this did 
not prevent advocates seeking to deny the ability of the courts to adjudicate over the 
compliance of decisions taken in the name of national security.  As much is evident 
from the attempts of the Attorney General – in the seminal Belmarsh decision – to 
suggest that even in the light of the Human Rights Act “[i]t is for the Executive and 
Legislature, as a matter of political judgment, to decide what measures [are] necessary 
to protect public security”.28  In response to the Attorney General’s attempt to oust the 
supervisory jurisdiction granted by the Human Rights Act, the then Senior Law Lord, 
Lord Bingham, issued the following corrective  
 
The Attorney General is fully entitled to insist on the proper limits of judicial 
authority, but he is wrong to stigmatise judicial decision making as in some 
way undemocratic.  It is particularly inappropriate in a case such as the present 
in which Parliament has expressly legislated in section 6 of the 1998 Act to 
render unlawful any act of a public authority, including a court, incompatible 
with a Convention right, has required courts (in section 2) to take account of 
relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence, has (in section 3) required courts, so far as 
possible, to give effect to Convention rights and has conferred a right of 
appeal on derogation issues.  The effect is not, of course, to override the 
sovereign legislative authority of the Queen in Parliament, since if primary 
legislation is declared to be incompatible the validity of the legislation is 
unaffected (section 4(6)) and the remedy lies with the appropriate minister 
(section 10), who is answerable to Parliament.  The 1998 Act gives the courts 
a very specific, wholly democratic, mandate.
29
 
 
                                                 
24
 J. Allan, “Statutory Bills of Rights: You read words in, you read words out, you take Parliament’s 
clear intention and you shake it all about – doin’ the Sankey Hanky Panky” in T. Campbell, K.D. 
Ewing and A. Tomkins (eds.), The Legal Protection of Human Rights: Sceptical Essays (2011; Oxford 
University Press), p. 116 - 120.      
25
 On which see: J. L. Hiebert, “Governing Like Judges?’ in T. Campbell, K. D. Ewing and A. Tomkins 
(eds.), The Legal Protection of Human Rights: Sceptical Essays (2011; Oxford University Press).   
26
 D. Nicol, “The Human Rights Act and the Politicians” (2004) 24 Legal Studies 451, p. 453 
27
 D. Nicol, “The Human Rights Act and the Politicians” (2004) 24 Legal Studies 451, p. 453 
28
 A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 A.C. 68, at 
[85].   
29
 A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 A.C. 68, at 
[42].  
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The sentiments behind Lord Bingham’s admonishment of the Attorney General were 
echoed elsewhere in the House of Lords’ decision.30  The consequence of the 
legislative direction provided by the Human Rights Act – as Lord Bingham noted in 
Belmarsh – was that judicial scrutiny of executive decisions and/or legislation taken 
in furtherance of national security objectives on the basis of the Convention rights 
enjoyed parliamentary (and therefore indirectly democratic) sanction.  The fact that 
the Human Rights Act – a primary legislative instrument – required courts to exercise 
this counter-majoritarian function therefore provides a partial rejoinder to accounts of 
the judicialised constitution which emphasise the empire-building tendencies of the 
courts under which the judges themselves have lobbied for, and developed the 
common law in order to obtain, a greater constitutional role.
31
  By contrast with the 
pre-Human Rights Act emergence of a nascent common law rights jurisprudence,
32
 
the courts’ constitutional functions under the Act come with a legislative seal of 
approval.  
 
The fact that the Human Rights Act was underpinned by a manifesto commitment 
made by the incoming 1997 Labour Administration, and subsequently enacted in 
primary legislation, cannot– however – fully address claims made by critics of the 
expanded reach of judicial power that the enforcement of standards against 
government “constrains the space for any future democratic decisions on that issue”.33  
We can say that the juridification of questions of rights was a clear – albeit partial – 
policy objective of the enactment and implementation of the Human Rights Act; but 
can also state that “political rights review”34 is as integral to the design and operation 
of the Act as review undertaken by courts.  Nor can the Human Rights Act’s 
democratic heritage explain away the difficulties of its practical implementation, for – 
as Mark Tushnet has observed
35
 – the legislative mandate underpinning the courts’ 
role in policing ECHR compliance at the national level disguises potential difficulties 
in its enforcement; judicial review under the New Commonwealth Model of 
Constitutionalism
36
 holds the potential to collapse into that which it seeks to eschew – 
namely, the polar opposites of strong form judicial review and the unchallengeable 
primacy of the political branches (as manifested in the formal doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty).   
 
The Continued Deification of National Security 
 
                                                 
30
 For instance: A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 
A.C. 68, at [176]. 
31
 M. Bevir, “The Westminster Model, Governance and Judicial Reform” (2008) 61 Parliamentary 
Affairs 559, p. 569. 
32
 See R v. Lord Chancellor, ex parte Witham [1998] Q.B 575.   
33
 M. Bevir, “The Westminster Model, Governance and Judicial Reform” (2008) 61 Parliamentary 
Affairs 559, p. 565.    
34
 J. L. Hiebert, “Parliament and the Human Rights Act: Can the JCHR help facilitate a Culture of 
Rights?” (2006) 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1, p. 3: “A key assumption envisaged by 
[the parliamentary rights] model is that rights will be protected not simply through after-the-fact 
evaluations by courts but by establishing opportunities and obligations for political rights review by 
ministers, parliamentarians and public authorities that are distinct from, and prior to, judicial review”.   
35
 M. Tushnet, “New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights- and Democracy-Based 
Worries” (2003) 38 Wake Forest Law Review 813.  
36
 S. Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism (2013; Cambridge University 
Press).   
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In spite of the legislative prompt provided by the Human Rights Act, obstacles to the 
justiciability of national security issues were, however, by no means immediately 
eradicated following the reception of ECHR rights into domestic law.  The statutory 
juridification of rights issues in the national security arena was – initially at least – 
beholden to the clear precedents regarding the perceived institutional incompetence of 
courts to question executive judgments taken in the interests of security.   
 
In Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman – concerning the 
deportation of a Pakistani national on grounds of the potential threat to national 
security that he posed – the House of Lords unanimously deferred to the executive 
assessment of the risk presented.
37
  As Lord Hoffmann noted  
 
In matters of national security, the cost of failure can be high.  This seems to 
me to underline the need for the judicial arm of government to respect the 
decisions of ministers of the Crown on the question of whether support for 
terrorist activities in a foreign country constitutes a threat to national security.  
It is not only that the executive has access to special information and expertise 
in these matters.  It is also that such decisions, with serious potential results for 
the community, require a legitimacy, which can be conferred only by 
entrusting them to persons responsible to the community through the 
democratic process.  If the people are to accept the consequences of such 
decisions, they must be made by persons to whom the people have elected and 
whom they can remove.
38
    
 
Legitimacy in the field of national security decision making, Hoffmann contends, can 
only result from an electoral mandate.  It follows that such decisions are – regardless 
of content or implications – due the respect of the judiciary.   
 
Lord Hoffmann is not the only judge to perpetuate this rigid separation of function in 
the Human Rights Act era.  Laws LJ too, in International Transport Roth GmbH v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, spoke of the paradigmatic areas of 
executive responsibility (security being one) within which the courts cannot ‘sensibly’ 
scrutinise the merits of decisions taken.
39
  Both approaches reflect a highly territorial 
approach to the separation of power under which certain governmental functions are 
held to be so umbilically linked to the role of a particular arm of government as to 
exclude any legitimate review or scrutiny undertaken by another branch.  The 
resulting ‘dilution’40 of judicial scrutiny powers in relation to such functions holds the 
capacity to see judicial review rendered otiose on the basis of a perceived lack of 
legitimacy.
41
   
 
                                                 
37
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman [2001] UKHL 47; [2003] 1 A.C. 153.  
38
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman [2001] UKHL 47; [2003] 1 A.C. 153, at [50]-
[54] and [62] (Lord Hoffmann).   
39
 International Transport Roth GmbH v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA 
Civ 158; [2003] QB 728, at [77] and [85]: “The first duty of government is the defence of the realm”.   
40
 On which see C. Chan, “Running Business as Usual: Deference in Counter-Terrorism Rights 
Review” in F. Davis and F. de Londras (eds.), Critical Debates on Counter-Terrorist Judicial Review 
(2014; Cambridge University Press), p. XXX .  
41
 For the most powerful critique of deference see: T.R.S. Allan, “Human Rights and Judicial Review: a 
Critique of “Due Deference”” (2006) Cambridge Law Journal 671.   
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The continuance of this – to adopt Murray Hunt’s terminology – spatial understanding 
of the interrelationship between the relevant powers of courts, executive and 
legislature in the national security arena is questionable.
42
  First, it runs counter to the 
trend – begun in the mid-twentieth century – towards breaking down jurisdictional 
barriers to judicial review,
43
 marking national security decisions out as being resistant 
to broader (judicially engineered) moves towards expanding the scope and rigour of 
judicial review.  Second, through the denial of the relevance of the rights implications 
to the judicial assessment of the legality of national security decisions it frustrates the 
purpose of the Human Rights Act, namely to subject governmental decisions which 
impact on individual liberties to judicial scrutiny and supervision regardless of the 
area of policy in which the decision is taken.          
 
The Necessary Superiority of the Political 
 
Though the Human Rights Act sought to find a middle ground between the competing 
primacies of law and politics, the superior democratic claims of the political branches 
would not be easily displaced.  As has already been alluded to, the continued 
influence of parliamentary sovereignty – and behind its façade the executive 
dominance of the legislature – perpetuates the sense that legislative decisions are (or 
should be) immune from challenge.  While the standard common law decisions on the 
legal authority of Parliament – Ellen St Estates44 and British Railways Board v. 
Pickin
45
 among them – have lost some of their allure in the light of constitutional 
developments,
46
 the sense among many that Parliament should remain necessarily 
supreme, and its decisions unquestionable in the courts, remains undiminished.   
 
Michael Howard, then Leader of the Conservative Party, for instance responded to the 
Belmarsh decision in the following terms 
 
Parliament must be supreme.  Aggressive judicial activism will not only 
undermine the public’s confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary, but it 
could also put our security at risk – and with it the freedoms the judges seek to 
defend.
47
 
 
                                                 
42
 M. Hunt, “Sovereignty’s Blight: Why Contemporary Public Law needs the concept of “Due 
Deference”” in N. Bamforth and P. Leyland (eds.), Public Law in an Multi-Layered Constitution (2003, 
Oxford; Hart Publishing). 
43
 M. Hunt, “Sovereignty’s Blight: Why Contemporary Public Law needs the concept of “Due 
Deference”” in N. Bamforth and P. Leyland (eds.), Public Law in an Multi-Layered Constitution (2003, 
Oxford; Hart Publishing), p.347: “Much of the progress of modern public law has been in rolling back 
what were formerly considered to be zones of immunity from judicial review, reformulating the 
considerations which were thought to justify total immunity and reintegrating them into substantive 
public law as considerations which affect the particular, contextualised application of what have 
increasingly become accepted as universally applicable general principles.  That progress has been hard 
fought for, but it is constantly threatened by the failure to ground deference theory in anything other 
than crudely formalistic notions of the separation of powers and the supposed continued sovereignty of 
Parliament.’  
44
 Ellen Street Estates v. Minister of Health [1934] 1 K.B. 590. 
45
 British Railways Board v. Pickin [1974] A.C. 765.   
46
 Not least the United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union.  On which see N. Barber, “The 
Afterlife of Parliamentary Sovereignty” (2011) 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law 144.   
47
 M. Howard, “Judges Must Bow to the Will of Parliament” The Telegraph (10 August 2005).   
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Similar claims resonate beyond the national security arena, underpinning criticisms of 
perceived overreach by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
48
 and of the 
excessive powers allocated to the courts under the Human Rights Act.  Unease over 
this apparent new constitutional imbalance has prompted calls to reform or repeal the 
Human Rights Act in order to reassert the primacy of the elected branches: David 
Cameron – in taking the 2011 decision to convene a Commission to examine the case 
for the adoption of a British Bill of Rights – argued that “it is about time we ensured 
that [human rights] decisions are made in this Parliament rather than in the courts”.49  
 
The picture painted is one of stark choices; between courts and Parliament, between 
legitimate or illegitimate decisions, between individual freedom and security.  In the 
national security arena, this discourse is – as we have seen – underpinned by a 
weighty body of jurisprudence maintaining a division between questions of policy and 
law.  At the level of constitutional principle this approach derives further support from 
the political constitution’s ideological preference for elected officials over courts50 
and ultimately – of course – also appeals to the Diceyan subjection of courts to the 
will of Parliament.
51
  This binary division of powers is – to a degree – reflected in the 
institutional design of the Human Rights Act; parliamentary sovereignty was clearly 
intended to be preserved in form.
52
  But to deny the valid judicial input into questions 
engaging both rights and national security on that basis is to discount the rather more 
sophisticated separation of powers envisaged by the framers of the Act.
53
   
 
Responses of this sort to judicial decisions which are perceived to frustrate the 
objectives of democratically elected officials are, of course, by no means new.
54
  But 
given the late-twentieth century rebalancing of constitutional power, culminating in 
the implementation of the Human Rights Act, such continued denials of judicial 
competence to examine legislative and executive decisions on rights grounds almost 
certainly tell us something about the failure of the Act to embed a culture of 
justification across constitutional processes and of the inability of dialogue theory to 
accurately capture the relative passion and dispassion of parliamentarians and 
judges.
55
  The sense that Parliament be required to justify its enactments – that they be 
tested against (even self-imposed) standards of legality – therefore continues to sit 
uneasily with the constitution’s traditional reverence for statutory language and the 
unquestionable legal authority of the legislature.
56
  In the face of this tension, claims 
regarding the solidity of the Human Rights Act’s position within the United 
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Kingdom’s new constitutional settlement should be treated with a degree of caution, 
but so too do those arguments which would position the elected branches as now 
finding themselves at the mercy of the judges.     
 
While it has long been acknowledged that courts play a political role – “[t]o require a 
supreme court to make certain kinds of political decisions does not make those 
decisions any less political”57 – the extent to which judicial intervention is permitted, 
and the consequences of intervention for the decision under scrutiny, remain issues of 
intense controversy.  But accurate assessment of these issues is, it is argued, hampered 
by base-level denials of the role to be played by courts in the assessment of certain 
areas claimed to be within the exclusive competence of the executive or legislature.  
To defend an activity as being based on a “pre-eminently political judgment”58 should 
not insulate that activity from questioning scrutiny (within Parliament or the courts) 
any more that it should automate compliance with law.    
 
Deference and Relative Institutional Competence 
 
Deference has in many respects become the “the classic separation of powers device 
articulated in the post-Human Rights Act era”.59  It is the method by which the 
potential for Human Rights Act review to morph into something altogether more 
potent, more capable (perhaps) of truly stifling democratic government, has been – for 
the most part – avoided.60  That perceived institutional superiority should impact on 
judicial responses to legislative initiatives argued to infringe rights should – in a 
system shaped by parliamentary sovereignty – come as no great surprise.  Deference 
‘as submission’ – that is, the self-denial of the competence to scrutinise decisions in 
specific areas of policy – is however incompatible with the new constitutional 
equilibrium which the Human Rights Act sought to cement.
61
  To this extent, Lord 
Hoffmann – in the ProLife Alliance decision – was correct to highlight the inaccuracy 
of the apparent subjection of courts to the elected branches perpetuated by the 
language of deference.
62
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While a degree of deference is – as Lord Bingham has recognised63 – a natural 
response to the uncertain territory the judges are confronted with in assessing the 
ECHR implications of national security decisions, this has not (indeed should not) 
come at the expense of meaningful scrutiny of the rights issues raised.  In Belmarsh, 
as much was recognised by Lord Rodger of Earlsferry who noted that “[d]eference 
does not mean abasement … even in matters of national security”.64  Nor – despite the 
“great weight”65 which continues to attach to primary legislation – is deference the 
automated judicial response to legislative action; as Lord Bingham noted in Lichniak, 
“[t]he fact that a statute represents the settled will of the democratic assembly is not a 
conclusive reason for upholding it”.66  What deference does permit, however, is the 
preservation of the sense that certain decisions are more appropriately determined by 
(elected) political actors  
 
The more purely political … a question is, the more appropriate it will be for 
political resolution and the less likely it is to be an appropriate matter for 
judicial decision.  The smaller, therefore, will be the potential role of the court.  
It is the function of political and not judicial bodies to resolve political 
questions.
67
  
 
This concession – while perhaps a truism – importantly does not exclude the 
possibility, or legitimacy, of judicial review.
68
    
 
However, while the abandonment of submissive deference marked by Belmarsh 
stands as a clear step towards closing the accountability loop in national security 
decisions this is not to suggest that the deployment of ECHR based review has been 
without controversy.  Deference might serve to preserve respect for the policy choices 
of the primary decision-maker, but the balance of power apparent on the face of the 
Act may nonetheless present difficulties once deployed in practice.   
 
First, the readiness of courts to ‘read in’ implied conditions and terms into ostensibly 
clear legislative provisions has, in particular, drawn criticism from the parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR).  In its 2008 report into Counter Terrorism 
Policy and Human Rights, the Joint Committee noted with some surprise the 
willingness of the Law Lords to read words into statutory provisions in order to render 
them compatible with the ECHR rights.
69
  Specifically, the JCHR considered that the 
use of section 3(1) in Secretary of State for the Home Department v. MB was 
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particularly difficult to defend.
70
  MB concerned the compatibility of the system of 
closed material hearings handled by special advocates in control order cases under 
sections 2 and 3(1)(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 with Article 6(1) of the 
ECHR.  By a four-to-one majority,
71
 the House of Lords held that the case should be 
referred back to the trial judge, relying on section 3(1) to subject the provisions to the 
requirements of procedural fairness inherent in Article 6(1).
72
   
 
Given its own interpretation of the overall scheme of the Human Rights Act, the 
JCHR felt that the application of section 3(1) in MB was particularly hard to justify; 
the Committee argued  
 
… the Human Rights Act deliberately gives Parliament a central role in 
deciding how best to  protect the rights protected in the EHCR.  Striking the 
balance between sections 3 and 4 of the Human Rights Act is crucial to the 
scheme of democratic rights protection.  In our view it would have been more 
consistent with the scheme of the Human Rights Act for the House of Lords to 
have given a declaration of incompatibility, requiring Parliament to think 
again about the balance it struck in the control order legislation between the 
various competing interests.
73
 
 
Judicially assessed compatibility did not, in this instance, equate with clarity.  That 
the precise means by which Article 6 was to be vindicated following this use of 
section 3 remained uncertain ultimately resulted in the issue returning to the apex 
court in AF (No.3).
74
 
 
By the time AF reached the House of Lords, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR had 
handed down its decision in A v. United Kingdom.
75
  The consequences of A for the 
domestic litigation were in its conclusive finding that “national security may need to 
give way to the interests of a fair hearing”.76  As Lord Scott summarised, the question 
for the Law Lords was whether “a judicial process the purpose of which is to impose, 
or to confirm the imposition of, onerous obligations on individuals on grounds and 
evidence of which they are not and cannot be informed constitute a fair hearing? The 
judgment of the Grand Chamber in A v. United Kingdom […] has made clear that, for 
the purpose of Strasbourg jurisprudence and article 6(1) of the Convention, it does 
not”.77  The finding in A was that the “requirements of a fair hearing are never 
satisfied if the decision is “based solely or to a decisive extent” on closed material”.78  
Acknowledging that the ruling might “destroy the system of control orders” a 
hesitance to directly apply A is discernible from a number of the Law Lords’ 
speeches.
79
  Yet, in the face of a recent, authoritative and on-point decision from the 
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Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, the Law Lords felt compelled to apply the Strasbourg 
ruling.  Second then, the nature of the appropriate response of national courts in 
human rights litigation may well be conditioned by factors external to the Human 
Rights Act itself, and to the courts’ perceptions of their own institutional competence 
vis-à-vis the elected branches of government.  Even though the Law Lords were 
conscious that the consequence of their decision might be abandonment of the control 
order regime, the outcome was felt to be unavoidable in the light of the state’s 
obligations under the ECHR: “[e]ven though we are dealing with rights under a 
United Kingdom statute, in reality, we have no choice: Argentoratum locutum, 
iudicium finitum – Strasbourg has spoken, the case is closed”.80 
 
Engagement, Refinement, Dialogue? 
 
It is of course correct to say that Parliament, the executive and courts undertake 
different constitutional functions,
81
 and that primary responsibility for certain of those 
functions might rest with one branch of government.  But to then say that – as a result 
– those functions should continue to be immune to scrutiny by one or more of the 
other branches is to suggest something quite different.  The Human Rights Act has 
gone some way to establishing a new constitutional equilibrium.
82
  Human Rights Act 
review does not subject the elected branches of government to the rule of the courts, 
but cultivates a tension between the two that is abundantly clear in the realm of state 
security  
 
 The first responsibility of government in a democratic society is owed to the 
public.  It is to protect and safeguard the lives of its citizens.  It is the duty of 
the court to do all that it can to respect and uphold that principle.  But the court 
has another duty too.  It is to protect and safeguard the rights of the 
individual.
83
  
 
Even in the light of the developments prompted by the Human Rights Act, the role of 
the courts remains constitutionally secondary in at least one crucial respect; as Laws 
LJ has written 
  
The judges are constrained … rightly, by the fact that their role is reactive; 
they cannot initiate; all they can do is apply principle to what is brought before 
them by others.  Nothing could be more distinct from the duty of political 
creativity owed to us by Members of Parliament.
84
 
 
To suggest that the Human Rights Act therefore “welcomes the courts into the policy-
making process”85 is to mislead as to the necessarily responsive role played by the 
domestic judiciary when asked to examine ECHR compliance of a particular policy or 
legislative initiative.   
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Having said this – looking at the recent transition from indefinite detention without 
trial,
86
 to control orders,
87
 to terrorism prevention and investigation measures
88
 – it is 
clear that judicial decisions have influenced the revision and refinement of legislation 
in the national security field (and powers exercised under that legislation) to an extent 
that, pre-Human Rights Act, would have been inconceivable.  Is this influence 
constitutionally intolerable?  Those who would appeal to the Diceyan understanding 
of legislation immune from legal challenge, to notions of pure and (potentially) 
unquestionable democratic/political judgment and expertise,
89
 or (increasingly) to a 
notion of national sovereignty,
90
 would argue that it is.  A rather basic counter-
argument would defend this judicial refining role on pragmatic grounds, given that the 
initiatives responded to amount to a catalogue of “repressive measures unprecedented 
in peacetime Britain”,91 that legislation in this field is occasionally hastily enacted,92 
and that – without the (limited) powers bestowed by the Human Rights Act – these 
powers would be all the more likely to exist in a constitutional “vacuum in which the 
citizen would be kept without protection against a misuse of executive powers”.93 
 
A more sophisticated thesis would suggest that the constitution has developed to the 
extent that claims to unquestionable or unchallengeable authority (whatever their 
source) – and the accountability vacuums which result – are rightly regarded with 
scepticism.
94
  The hierarchical constitution with Parliament at its pinnacle has given 
way to something more heterarchical, which seeks to give recognition to institutional 
competence and expertise without allowing either to operate as insulation from 
scrutiny.  This is recognised structurally in the weak form of legislative review 
established by the Human Rights Act and practically in the judicial processes of 
weighing competing considerations.  Affording a degree of latitude – deference – to 
the range of responses available to the primary decision maker, recognising the 
differing nature of the decision-making process and the reasons (and evidence) 
articulated in support of a given policy decision, allow courts to acknowledge the 
distinct constitutional roles of the legislature and executive without either usurping 
them or prompting the abandonment of objective assessment of the rights implications 
of the impugned decision.
95
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The Rebalanced – Juridified – Constitution? 
 
The counter-majoritarian role that the Human Rights Act envisages courts play – 
rather than damaging democratic governance – should be seen as supporting, or 
complementing, it by both subjecting the (hypothetically unlimited) legislative 
authority of Parliament to rights-based audit and by enabling courts to render 
unlawful public body decisions which disproportionately interfere with those same 
rights.  In policing the Convention rights the courts are able to bring to bear concerns 
relating to liberties which the democratic or policy-making process may be ill-
positioned to consider (the impact of decisions on individual liberty).  That national 
security issues are no longer regarded as being tantamount to non-justiciable is – far 
from amounting to a challenge to the democratic process – a clear advance for a 
constitution purporting to adhere to the values of the rule of law.  The Human Rights 
Act does not make policy-makers out of judges any more than it subjects the policy-
making process to the whims of the courts.  Rather it permits issues cutting across the 
intersection of policy, expert judgment, and sensitive factual data to be analysed for 
compatibility with human rights norms, tempered by the acknowledgment on the part 
of the courts that deference preserves the primary decision-making autonomy of the 
elected branches.  A higher standard of justification may now be required of rights-
infringing decisions taken in the name of national security, but we should be careful to 
portray this as strengthening rather than compromising our constitutional systems of 
accountability.   
